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It is  often  assumed  by  health  economists  that  the  principal  objective  of  health  care  is  to  maximise  pop-
ulation health.  However,  people  may  be willing  to sacriﬁce  overall  health  in  order  to  direct  resources
towards  high  priority  disease  areas,  such  as cancer.  This paper  examines  whether  society  is willing  to
pay more  for  cancer  prevention  and treatment  than for other  types  of  health  care.  The  policy  context  in
the UK,  where  special  assessment  criteria  and funding  arrangements  are  currently  in place  for  certain
cancer  drugs,  is described.  Selected  empirical  studies  that  have  examined  the  extent  of public  support  for
a ‘cancer  premium’  are  then  summarised  and  discussed.  The  evidence  available  is not sufﬁciently  strong
to conclude  whether  or not  willingness  to pay  is higher  for  cancer  prevention  and treatment.
©  2016  The  Author.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND. Introduction
Economic evaluation is used to help answer the question of
hether a particular health intervention or programme is worth
nvesting in, relative to other things that could be done with the
ame resources. One approach to economic evaluation, in which
oth the costs and the consequences of candidate interventions
re measured in monetary terms, is known as cost-beneﬁt analy-
is. Although cost-beneﬁt analysis is used in many settings and can
e described as the broadest form of economic evaluation, in prac-
ice it is restricted to including only those consequences that can
e expressed in terms of money – for example, if there is evidence
n people’s willingness to pay for the beneﬁts offered by the inter-
ention in question. An alternative approach – cost-effectiveness
nalysis – measures the consequences of interventions in terms of
 single unit of health output. A common approach is to use the
uality-adjusted life year (QALY) for this purpose. The QALY is a
eneric measure of health that combines health-related quality of
ife and length of life in a single index (where one QALY is equivalent
o one year of life in full health). The results of a cost-effectiveness
nalysis can therefore be expressed in terms of the incremental cost
er QALY gained by investing in the intervention under evaluation.
he cost-effectiveness of that intervention can then be compared to
hat of other interventions, or to some threshold value that reﬂects
ither displaced activities or societal willingness to pay for an addi-
ional QALY. For a general introduction to the economic evaluation
f health care, see Drummond et al. [1].
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It is often assumed by health economists that the principal
objective of health care is to maximise population health. Current
practice assumes that all equal-sized health gains are equally valu-
able, irrespective of who beneﬁts from them. The National Institute
for Health and Care Excellence (NICE), an organisation responsible
for making recommendations about the cost-effective use of health
care resources in England, formally documents this principle in the
‘reference case’ deﬁned in its methods guide: “an additional QALY
should receive the same weight regardless of any other character-
istics of the people receiving the health beneﬁt” [2].
However, maximising population health may not be the only
purpose of health care. Other objectives might include the reduc-
tion of health (or other) inequalities, directing resources towards
high priority disease areas, and improving the health of individu-
als with the greatest levels of unmet need. Such objectives, which
are often related to equity, may  be consistent with public opin-
ion. Reviews of studies examining public preferences in relation to
health care resource allocation indicate that many people consider
the value of a QALY to vary according to the characteristics of the
patients receiving the QALYs [3,4]. Assuming that the preferences
of the general public samples surveyed are representative of the
overall views of society, this suggests that society may be willing
to pay more for a QALY for some patients (or for some conditions)
than for others. This paper examines the extent to which this is the
case for cancer.
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. First, I will
describe the policy context in the UK, where since 2009 some can-
cer drugs have been subject to assessment criteria and funding
arrangements that differ from those for other types of treatments. I
will then discuss the ﬁndings of selected stated preference studies
that have examined the extent of public support for a ‘cancer pre-
der the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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ium’, before summing up and highlighting a key challenge facing
olicy makers.
. UK policy context
In January 2009, NICE introduced guidance to be considered
y its technology appraisal committees when evaluating life-
xtending, end of life treatments [5]. The guidance states that if
ertain criteria are met, the committee will consider giving greater
eight to the QALY gains achieved in the later stages of disease. In
ffect, this means that life-extending end of life treatments may  be
ecommended by NICE even if they are less cost-effective than is
sually considered acceptable. The criteria, now enshrined in NICE’s
echnology appraisal methods guide [2], are set out below:
the treatment is indicated for patients with short life expectancy,
normally less than 24 months;
there is sufﬁcient evidence to indicate that the treatment offers an
extension to life, normally of at least an additional three months,
compared with current NHS treatment;
the technology is licensed, or otherwise indicated, for small
patient populations normally not exceeding a cumulative total
of 7000 for all licensed indications in England.
NICE’s end of life guidance constitutes the Institute’s only
xplicit departure from its reference case rule that all QALYs should
e regarded as being of equal weight. It reﬂects a recognition of the
dea that society places special value on treatments that extend
he life of end of life patients, as long as the life extension is of
 reasonable quality [6]. The guidance is not speciﬁc to cancer,
ut in practice only cancer drugs have met  the criteria for spe-
ial consideration [7,8]. Further, it was introduced following several
igh-proﬁle rejections of new treatments for renal cancer, which
esulted in criticism from pharmaceutical companies, oncologists
nd patients [9–11], and in calls for a more generous coverage pol-
cy for cancer treatments.
In addition, a ring-fenced ‘Cancer Drugs Fund’ (CDF), intended
o improve access to cancer medicines that have not been recom-
ended by NICE and that are not routinely available in the NHS,
as been in place in England since 2011. The purpose of the CDF
s to “enable cancer treatments to be funded by the NHS where
ociety values their beneﬁts more than the beneﬁts that could be
rovided by spending the funding on other treatments, elsewhere
n the NHS” [12]. If society indeed places special value on the health
ains achieved by cancer patients, then “cancer treatments which
rovide less health beneﬁts than the alternative use of funds might
till be socially more valuable that the alternatives” [12], and the
tandard approach of treating all QALYs as being equal may  result
n cancer treatments being wrongly rejected. The CDF is unique in
hat no other health condition has a fund dedicated to improving
ccess to drugs. Hence, there is a clear sense that policy makers
n England are willing to pay more for cancer treatments than for
ther types of health care.
In Scotland, a ‘New Medicines Fund’ has been introduced to
ncrease access to medicines for patients with rare or end of life con-
itions [13], including many cancer drugs. This followed calls from
he Scottish Government for the Scottish Medicines Consortium to
evise its appraisal methods to take better account of orphan and
nd of life treatments [14].
Most other European countries do not have separate funding
echanisms or assessment criteria for cancer treatments, though
ome explicitly incorporate factors such as the extent of disease
everity, unmet need and therapeutic innovation into their assess-
ents. Treatments for cancer may  be more likely than other typesolicy 11 (2017) 60–64 61
of treatment to meet the criteria needed to be eligible for a more
favourable assessment.
Outside of Europe, the Canadian Agency for Drugs and Tech-
nologies in Health (CADTH) has two separate processes for making
drug reimbursement recommendations: the pan-Canadian Oncol-
ogy Drug Review, for cancer medicines only; and the Common
Drug Review, for medicines in all other disease areas. The eco-
nomic rationale for having a separate review process for cancer
drugs has recently been questioned [15]. A review of submissions
considered by the Pharmaceutical Beneﬁts Advisory Committee in
Australia concluded that the Committee’s decision making criteria
are applied “equally to cancer and non-cancer drugs in that cancer
drugs are neither favoured nor disadvantaged, but they are more
expensive and target a smaller population than non-cancer drugs”
[16]. The authors conclude by calling for research to determine soci-
ety’s willingness to pay for a QALY, and whether it is different in
the context of cancer.
3. Do people wish to give higher priority to cancer
treatments?
As mentioned above, there is a growing literature examin-
ing whether QALYs (or any other unit of health gain) should be
weighted differently for different groups of patients. The debate
has recently focused on whether a QALY gain for end of life patients
should be considered more valuable than a QALY gain for other
types of patient, triggered in part by the policy situation in the UK.
Since the introduction of NICE’s supplementary guidance, several
studies have attempted to investigate empirically whether society
is prepared to fund life-extending end of life treatments that would
not meet the criteria for non-end of life treatments. These studies
have used a variety of stated preference techniques, including will-
ingness to pay exercises, person trade-offs, budget allocation tasks
and discrete choice experiments. A recent review of (a selection of)
the empirical evidence concluded that the overall picture is mixed,
“with some studies reporting strong evidence and others reporting
little or no evidence of support for an end of life premium” [17].
Despite the recent interest in understanding people’s prefer-
ences regarding the treatment of end of life patients, it should be
noted that end of life and cancer are not synonymous. A policy
of giving extra weight to the beneﬁts of cancer (and only cancer)
treatments would exclude other terminal or end of life conditions,
such as motor neurone disease and advanced heart disease. Fur-
ther, many treatments for cancer are indicated for patients with
early stage disease, who  may  not be close to their end of life, and
might expect to live for much longer than the 24 month cut-off
speciﬁed in NICE’s end of life guidance.
Studies examining societal preferences regarding the relative
value of different types of treatments often use ‘unlabelled’ designs,
whereby the names of the conditions are not speciﬁed. This may
be due to concerns that the use of labels induces emotional and
biased responses, and that survey respondents’ perceptions about
the conditions could outweigh any preferences they hold regarding
the other attributes being studied. A counterargument to this is
that people’s perceptions and fears about speciﬁc conditions are
precisely what should be being measured, and that when presented
with an abstract, unlabelled survey, respondents may respond in
ways that do not reﬂect their actual views about how health care
resources should be prioritised.
Most of the end of life preference studies summarised in the
aforementioned review [17] used unlabelled designs, with three
exceptions – all of which used the label of ‘cancer’. In a study of the
preferences of the Canadian general public and health care decision
makers, Skedgel et al. presented survey respondents with a series
of tasks which involved allocating a hypothetical budget between
62 K.K. Shah / Journal of Cancer P
Box 1: Text used in Linley and Hughes [20].
Cancer vs. Non-cancer disease
Imagine two diseases – Disease A and Disease B. They are both
potentially fatal, affect the same age groups and are equally
common. The number of useful medicines available to treat
each disease is the same. The only difference between the two
diseases is that:
Disease A – is a type of cancer
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of death based on factors such as the age of the victims and theDisease B – is some other non-cancer type of disease.
wo health programmes [18]. The patients beneﬁtting from the
rogrammes were described as having different forms of cancer,
hough speciﬁc diagnoses were not mentioned. Both programmes
ere for cancer patients, as opposed to one being for cancer patients
nd the other being for patients with a different condition. Thus,
he results demonstrate respondents’ preferences over the stud-
ed attributes within the cancer context (for example, the authors
eport evidence of an overall preference for prioritising younger
ver older cancer patients) but cannot determine whether they
laced special value on the treatment of cancer per se.
In a small-scale exploratory study seeking to investigate the
xistence of a ‘cancer premium’, Baker et al. asked general pub-
ic respondents in Scotland to rank different health programmes
based loosely on the subjects of NICE technology appraisals)
ccording to their importance as areas for public funding [19].
wo of the programmes referred to the provision of new drugs
or cancer – for leukaemia and liver cancer. The other four pro-
rammes related to non-cancer treatments: laparoscopic surgery
or hernias; a new drug for rheumatoid arthritis; statins for people
t risk of heart disease; and a new drug for Alzheimer’s dis-
ase. On average, the drugs for leukaemia and liver cancer were
anked second and fourth, respectively (the statins programme
as ranked ﬁrst). Further, in a linked willingness to pay exer-
ise, the majority of respondents expressed preference for the
iver cancer drug – described as offering a three-month exten-
ion to a small number (ﬁve) of patients – over the surgery
or hernias – described as offering an unquantiﬁed improve-
ent in quality of life for a relatively large number (100) of
atients.
In a larger, web-based study, Linley and Hughes sought the
references of 4118 members of the general public regarding
everal prioritisation criteria relevant to the UK policy context
20]. Respondents were presented with a series of choices about
ow to allocate NHS funding between pairs of patient groups.
he groups differed in terms of a single attribute, with all other
ttributes (including the size of the treatment effect) held equal.
he authors included one scenario in which the choice was
etween spending the budget on medicines for potentially fatal
ancer and on medicines for a potentially fatal disease other
han cancer (Box 1). This was in addition to a separate sce-
ario presenting a choice between treatments for end of life
nd non-end of life patients, but which did not mention can-
er.
Respondents were offered 11 different response options.
hey could spend all of the funding on treating the cancer
atients; or spend all of the funding on treating the non-
ancer patients; or choose an intermediate split, such as a
0:50 equal split or a 60:40 split in favour of the cancer
atients. The majority of respondents (64.1%) opted for an equal
plit of the funding, with only 30.8% choosing to give allo-
ate more than half of the funding to treating cancer patients.
inley and Hughes conclude that their study challenges the
ationale for the CDF and the prioritisation of treatments for can-
er.olicy 11 (2017) 60–64
It is noteworthy that NICE’s supplementary guidance accom-
modates end of treatments that extend life but not those that
only improve quality of life. The question of whether people
would support a policy of prioritising the former over the lat-
ter is rarely examined in the studies reviewed by Shah [17].
One of the few studies that did investigate this issue com-
prised a survey of 813 members the Spanish general public, in
which preferences were elicited using the willingness to pay and
person trade-off techniques [21]. The authors found that pallia-
tive/quality of life-improving end of life treatments were valued
more highly than life-extending end of life treatments, which in
turn were valued more highly than treatments offering tempo-
rary quality of life improvements for non-end of life patients (all
treatments offered equal-sized QALY gains). They conclude that
“cancer drugs for people at the end of life could receive an extra
weight if they reduce toxicity and therefore symptoms, even if
they do not extend life” and that “quality of life measurement
is of paramount importance in the evaluation of cancer drugs”
[21].
4. Cancer as a ‘dread’ disease
The debate as to whether cancer is worthy of special consider-
ation extends beyond the ﬁelds of cost-effectiveness analysis and
health technology assessment, which tend to focus on whether a
particular treatment should receive public reimbursement based
on how much additional health it generates. The question has also
been explored in the literature on the value of a statistical life (VSL)
and the value of a prevented fatality (VPF). VSL and VPF estimates
allow the effects of changes in fatality risk – including those effects
associated with pain, grief and suffering – to be captured in mon-
etary terms. This enables the effects to be included in cost-beneﬁt
analysis, which can be used not only in the health context but also
in, for example, transport and environment sectors, i.e.  settings
where policy choices involve balancing incremental costs and risk
reductions. The focus in this literature tends to be on the value of
reducing the total number of deaths from cancer, rather than the
value of improving the health of cancer patients.
In a study of the value of safety conducted by Jones-Lee et al.,
1103 UK general public survey respondents were presented with
three causes of death (motor accidents, heart disease and cancer),
together with the approximate annual number of deaths associ-
ated with those causes in England and Wales (4000, 11,000 and
16,000, respectively) [22]. Respondents were asked to imagine that
it was possible to reduce the number of deaths by 100 the fol-
lowing year, and were asked which cause they would choose to
have reduced. The majority of respondents (76%) expressed a pref-
erence for reducing the number of deaths caused by cancer. The
authors note that the study ﬁndings suggest that people distinguish
between different causes of death and “would be willing to pay very
substantial sums to avoid the protracted physical and psychologi-
cal pain prior to cancer death” [22]. However, it is unclear whether
respondents’ choices were driven by their aversion to the (per-
ceived) pain associated with death from cancer, or by their aversion
to death from cancer per se,  irrespective of the pain involved.
The ﬁndings of the Jones-Lee et al. study may  have inﬂuenced
the Health and Safety Executive, a UK public body responsible for
workplace welfare and research on occupational risks, to recom-
mend doubling the VPF when that fatality is caused by cancer [23].
A later study commissioned by the Health and Safety Executive
found evidence that people differentiate between different typesextent of responsibility for the cause of death [24]. For example, the
weight given to a death from lung cancer caused by occupational
exposure to asbestos was  found to be greater than that for a similar
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eath caused by smoking. Considering all of the evidence, however,
he authors concluded that there should be no differentiation in the
PFs for the contexts examined in the study.
A US study by Viscusi et al. used a stated preference approach
o examine general public survey respondents’ willingness to pay
or a reduction in risk of dying from bladder cancer caused by
rsenic in their drinking water [25]. Respondents were asked
hether they would favour or oppose a new water treatment
hat reduced their risk of getting bladder cancer (expressed as
A out of 100,000 chance’) but would also lead to an increase in
heir annual water bill. The results provide evidence of a can-
er premium relative to the median VSL estimates associated
ith acute fatalities, albeit more modest than the premia pro-
osed for policy assessments in the UK [23] and the US [26].
he authors note that cancer not only causes the loss of life
ut, unlike some other forms of death, can involve substan-
ial, long-lasting morbidity effects. They describe cancer as a
dread disease’, on the grounds that “it generates a fear that is
reater than would be justiﬁed by its objective risk probabilities”
25].
A recent paper by McDonald et al. contends that the existence
nd size of a cancer premium can reﬂect morbidity associated
ith dying from cancer, dread associated with the prospect of
ying from cancer, and discounting due to ‘latency’ (the typical
elay between an individual’s exposure to cancer-causing con-
itions and the onset of cancer symptoms) [27]. The latter is
articularly important when considering the value of interven-
ions that seek to prevent cancer. Based on the results of the
urvey of 157 members of the UK general public, the authors ﬁnd
he morbidity accounts for the majority of the cancer premium
bserved. They suggest that a case can be made for increasing
he VSL (and therefore allocating more resources to the preven-
ion of cancer) in contexts where the latency period is short and
he cancer fatality would be preceded by a lengthy period of ill-
ess.
Overall, the evidence in relation to a cancer premium is mixed,
ith some studies reporting results consistent with a higher VSL
n cancer and others ﬁnding no difference in VSL estimates when
omparing cancer and non-cancer deaths [28].
If a cancer premium does exist, a salient question to ask is what
actors are driving that premium. It may  reﬂect people’s concerns
bout having their life expectancy shortened. Or, as McDonald et al.
uggest, it may  reﬂect people’s concerns about the duration and
ntensity of the period of morbidity that often precedes a death
rom cancer [26]. In principle, both of these elements can be cap-
ured by the QALY model, which measures health in terms of both
uality of life and length of life (the limitations of the QALY in
he context of cancer is discussed elsewhere [29,30]). If it is felt
hat additional weight should be given to the health gains accru-
ng to the severely ill [31], then it is difﬁcult to argue that this
eight should apply only to cancer and not to other severe con-
itions.
A cancer premium may  also be driven by the kind of dread
ffect described by Viscusi et al., [25] whereby people are partic-
larly fearful of cancer, and their fear is disproportionate to the
ctual health impact and risks associated with the disease. Such
n effect cannot easily be incorporated in the QALY model [32]. A
urther question, then, is whether it is legitimate to base decisions
bout public policy and the reimbursement of medical treatments
n the fears of the general public, which may  be the result of biases
nd misconceptions (such as mistaken beliefs about the severity
f symptoms). From an economist’s perspective, it would appear
nefﬁcient (and potentially inequitable) to prioritise treatments for
ancer – a high proﬁle disease area – over more cost-effective treat-
ents for a relatively obscure condition. Indeed, the UK’s funding
[olicy 11 (2017) 60–64 63
arrangements for cancer have been criticised on the basis that they
are unfair to patients with other conditions [33].
5. Conclusion
The evidence summarised in this paper is not sufﬁciently strong
to conclude – one way or the other – whether society is willing to
pay more for cancer prevention and treatment than for other types
of health care. Most of the empirical public preference studies did
not set out to elicit preferences related to cancer speciﬁcally, and
those that did have reported conﬂicting results. There is a particular
dearth of research on the societal value of treatments that seek to
improve the quality of life of cancer patients. And even if people do
express preferences that indicate that cancer is somehow special,
a challenge facing policy makers is to determine whether these
stated preferences should form the basis for a policy that prioritises
investments in cancer interventions.
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